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Rights of Surface Owners on Federally
Patented Lands
HECTOR LAREAU*
This article explores the tension that exists between the rights
of surface owners and mineral lessees by focusing on those surface
owners who hold their estate from a patent issued under the Stock-
Raising Homestead Act (SRHA)' or the Agricultural Entry Act2
and parties who have a leasehold in the mineral estate the United
States retained when the surface estate was conveyed. Of primary
concern are the rights of the surface owner against incursion into his
homestead by a mineral lessee.
Part I of this article briefly explores the emotional reaction of
surface owners whose property is occupied by mineral lessees. To
establish the context in which the surface owners' rights arise, Part
II provides a brief survey of the statutory history surrounding sev-
ered estates created by the United States government. Part IV ex-
plores the remedies available to a surface owner when a mineral
lessee seeks to mine the underlying estate. Some of the surface
owners' remedies originate in statutory law,3 while others sound in
* Associate at Snyder & Schwarz, P.C., Rock Island, Illinois and 1993 Honors
Graduate of Drake University Law School.
Stock-Raising Homestead Act of December 29, 1916, 39 Stat. 862 (current ver-
sion at 43 U.S.C. § § 291-299 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 299 was amended in
1993 but the changes "apply only to minerals not subject to disposition under - (1) the
Mineral Leasing Act ... (2) the Geothermal Steam Act.. .or (3) ...the Materials
Act of 1947 .. " 43 U.S.C.§ 299 (Supp. V 1993). The provisions of this amendment
are outside the scope of this paper.
' Agricultural Entry Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 509, (current version at 30 U.S.C. §§
121-125 (1988)).
43 U.S.C. § 299 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Any person who has acquired from the United States the coal or other
mineral deposits in any such land, or the right to mine and remove the
same, may reenter and occupy so much of the surface thereof as may be
required for all purposes reasonably incident to the mining or removal of
the coal or other minerals, first, upon securing the written consent or waiv-
er of the homestead entryman or patentee; second, upon payment of the
damages to crops or other tangible improvements to the owner thereof,
where agreement may be had as to the amount thereof; or, third, in lieu
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the common law of property, and still other remedies lie in tort.
Finally, this article will explore alternative systems by which surface
owners should be able to seek redress against mineral lessees and
will suggest alternatives to the status quo.
I. THE DILEMMA
Surface owners usually have strong feelings about the invasion
of their property. In Reno Livestock Corp. v. Sun Oil Co.6 a land-
owner had the following reaction when miners came onto his land:
[Reno] showed up on the scene and commanded the appellee and
its dirt contractor not to leave the established roadway for the
purpose of preparing the proposed well site and threatened to
shoot out the tires of the contractor's heavy earth-moving equip-
ment if the appellee and its contractor moved off the road.
Appellee and the contractor discreetly, with permission of Mr.
Reno, removed the equipment from the road to a nearby field
where it sat idle for several days. The dirt contractor thereafter
billed appellee $10,912.00 for equipment downtime. The action
for injunction and damages followed thereafter.7
The intrusion onto the surface estate, as in Reno Livestock, often
involves heavy earth-moving equipment and crews of work-
ers-hardly a minor inconvenience, even on a large farm or ranch.
The surface owner's desire to be left alone appears to be reasonable,
involving as it does time-honored expectations of quiet enjoyment
and use of the land.8 Simply put, surface owners want mineral les-
sees to stay away and if the crews must come, the surface owners
of either of the foregoing provisions, upon the execution of a good and
sufficient bond or undertaking to the United States for the use and benefit
of the entryman or owner of the land, to secure the payment of such
damages to the crops or tangible improvements of the entryman or own-
er....
For the common sense proposition that the grantor of a lease must hold a great-
er interest in the property than the grantee, see BLACK'S LAW DIcIoNARY 889 (6th ed.
1990).
, The law of trespass has limited application to the relationships of surface owners
and mineral lessees. See infra part m[C.
6 638 P.2d 147 (Wyo. 1981).
Id. at 150.
"The chief incidents of the ownership of property are the right to its possession,
the right to its use, and the right to its enjoyment, according to the owner's taste and
wishes, free from unreasonable interference, usually to the exclusion of others." 73 CJ.S.
Property § 27 (1994).
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want damages.
It is obvious from a mere examination and understanding of the
respective interests, that they are conflicting. Certainly a surface
owner or even permittee of surface rights cannot fully use and
enjoy those surface rights when constantly threatened with loss of
use of all or even a small portion thereof. True, a surface owner
or permittee may be entitled to receive compensation for damages,
but many times this is small or inadequate to replace the loss of
use of unique surface rights; unique, (sic] is used because each
piece of the surface of this Country is unique in some respect.
There may be similar land or comparable land, but it is necessari-
ly located elsewhere.9
Mineral lessees, on the other hand, have reasonable desires of
their own: they simply want a chance to extract a profit from below
the surface. They probably do not go prospecting for a chance to
annoy a surface owner. However, they inevitably make the unpleas-
ant discovery that there is land on their property."
Congress undertook to reconcile these competing expectations
in a series of policy decisions made just after the turn of the centu-
ry." These policy decisions differed slightly from traditional legal
views regarding severed estates. Traditionally, the mineral estate
was dominant, but not absolute. 2 Mineral owners were liable for
subjacent support and had the right only to use as much of the
surface as reasonably necessary to conduct the mining operations. 3
Despite Congressional changes to the traditional rules, the polarized
interests of the surface owner and the mineral lessee involve ten-
sions that frequently require judicial resolution.
Thomas v. Morton, 408 F. Supp. 1361, 1369-70 (D. Ariz. 1976).
Paraphrased from Milton Berle, as quoted in 1,911 BEST THINGS ANYBODY
EvER SAm (1988) (Robert Byrne ed., 1988) ("I just got wonderful news from my real
estate agent in Florida. They found land on my property.").
See infra part ll.
,2 See generally Maria E. Mansfield, On the Cusp of Property Rights: Lessons
from Public Land Law, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 43, 67-68 (1991).
" Sylvia L. Harrison, Disposition of the Mineral Estate on United States Public
Lands: A Historical Perspective, 10 PUB. LAND L. REV. 131 (1989).
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SEVERED SURFACE AND MINERAL
ESTATES CREATED BY FEDERAL LAW 4
Much of the western United States once belonged to the federal
government as public domain lands.' Because of concerns that
speculators, interested only in the mineral value of the public do-
main lands, would acquire patents from the United States under the
general homestead laws, much of the public domain was closed to
homesteader entry near the turn of the century. 6
The government's concern was not that the land's surface
would not develop or that legitimate homesteaders would not be
able to patent land. Rather, the concern was that mineral operators
would acquire valuable lands "for a nominal price, thus depriving
the government of large revenues which it would otherwise ulti-
mately receive from such lands."' 7
Congress did not, however, neglect homesteaders entirely. 8 In
order to permit surface use of the lands President Taft had closed to
homestead entry, Congress passed statutes severing the surface
estate and opening it to homestead entry and patent; the mineral
estate was reserved to the federal government. 9 The reservation
included rights to prospect over and mine the subsurface estate."
Congress' purpose in severing the surface estate from the mineral
estate was to encourage the concurrent development of both the
surface and subsurface of SRHA lands. The Act was designed to
supply "a method for the joint use of the land by the entryman of
the surface thereof and the person who shall acquire from the
United States the right to prospect, enter, extract and remove all
" This historical overview of federally severed surface and mineral estates concerns
only those lands affected by the SRHA and the Agricultural Entry Act, supra notes 1-2.
For a general history of the acquisition of the public mineral estate, see Harrison, supra
note 13.
"5 Aulston v. United States, 915 F.2d 584, 585 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500
U.S. 916 (1991).
6 d. at 586.
" Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp., 100 P.2d 528, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940).
IS "In the wake of these large-scale withdrawals, it was evident that valuable farm
or ranch lands would go untilled or ungrazed because they were withdrawn from entry
on account of the valuable deposits believed to exist there." Aulston v. United States,
915 F.2d at 586.
'9 The two primary statutes relevant to this article are the Stock-Raising Homestead
Act of 1916, 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-299 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993), and the Agricultural Entry
Act of 1914, 30 U.S.C. §§ 121-125 (1988).
"' Bourdieu, 100 P.2d at 530.
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minerals that may underlie such lands."'"
Congress desired "concurrent development," but it remained
aware that the reserved estate's potential value far exceeded that of
the surface estate; the mining laws "provid[ed] an incentive for
individuals to locate claims to federal land containing valuable
mineral deposits."22 Accordingly, the incentives for mineral devel-
opment included limited liability for damages caused to the surface
estate by prospecting or mining.' Although Congress enlarged
miners' liability in 1949,24 their statutory exposure remained limit-
ed.
The Supreme Court characterized the statutes as disclosing
Congress' "intention to divide oil and gas lands into two estates for
the purposes of disposal--one including the underlying oil and gas
deposits and the other the surface-and to make the latter servient
to the former, which naturally would be suggested by their physical
relation and relative values."'  The Court made it clear that the
mineral estate's greater value, combined with the government's
financial interest in its exploitation, left the surface owner with only
limited protection.26
Congress may have intended to encourage concurrent develop-
ment of both estates,2' but the reality has been that surface devel-
opment is possible only within the constraints of mineral exploration
and exploitation.' The surface owner has almost no chance of pre-
venting damage to his land--damage that may go largely uncom-
25 Watt v. Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. 36, 50 (1983) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 35,
64th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 18 (1916)).
2 Id. at 51-51.
' See 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
24 30 U.S.C. § 54 (1988).
Notwithstanding the provisions of any Act of Congress to the contrary, any
person who on or after June 21, 1949 prospects for, mines, or removes by
strip or open pit mining methods, and minerals, from any land included in
a stock raising or other homestead entry or patent, and who had been
liable under such an existing Act only for damages caused thereby to the
crops or improvements of the entrymen or patentee, shall also be liable for
any damage that may be caused to the value of the land for grazing by
such prospecting for, mining, or removal of minerals.
s Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 504 (1928).
"In effect therefore a servitude is laid on the surface estate for the benefit of
the mineral estate to the end . . . that the United States may realize . . . a proper re-
turn from the extraction and removal of the minerals." Id. at 504-05.
27 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
"' See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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pensated.29
111. THE RIGHTS OF SURFACE OWNERS
While Congress provided mineral lessees with fairly limited
liability, it did not entirely strip the rights of the surface owners.
Surface patentees under the SRHA3° and the Agricultural Entry
Ace' received sufficient rights to the land, as determined by Con-
gress, to support their families.32 They received everything Con-
gress did not reserve to the federal government.33 One question for
the surface owner is, what exactly did Congress reserve? This ques-
tion is relevant because a surface owner can challenge the validity
of the lease if he can establish the mineral sought was not reserved
to the government.34 Such challenges to the validity of mineral
leases create certain procedural complexities, however.
A. Challenging the Mineral Lease's Validity
The surface owner can challenge the validity of a mining claim
through a private contest, 5 an administrative proceeding conducted
before the Department of the Interior.36 This Department also pro-
vides tribunals to hear challenges to sufficiency of bonds posted for
surface owners' protection.37 The various challenges may not be
combined in one proceeding.38 The surface owner can challenge the
lease's validity if he can show that no valuable ineiral has been discovered.'
2 See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
- 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
31 30 U.S.C. § 121 (1988).
32 United States v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.2d 1271, 1279 (9th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Ottoboni v. United States, 434 U.S. 930 (1977), reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 911
(1978).
33 id.
[A] patentee under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act receives title to all
rights in the land not reserved.... mhe mineral reservation is to be
read broadly in light of the agricultural purpose of the grant itself, and in
light of Congress' equally clear purpose to retain subsurface resources,
particularly sources of energy, for separate disposition and development in
the public interest.
See Sedgwick v. Callahan, 9 I.B.L.A. 216, 225-30 (1973) (If there is no valid
discovery of a mining claim, the claim cannot survive and entry is forbidden.).
3 Silvera, 42 I.B.L.A. 11, 16 (1979) (citing 43 CFR §4.450).
Id. at 17.
3' See infra note 60.
3' Michael, 79 1.B.L.A. 255 (1984).
" See Silvera, 42 I.B.L.A. 11, 16 (1979). See also Thomas v. Morton, 408 F.
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A challenge to the validity of a lease does not, however, pro-
vide all the trappings ordinarily associated with due process protec-
tion. Because the SRHA does not specifically require a formal hear-
ing under the Administrative Procedure Act,' no formal hearing is
available."' The Interior Board of Land Appeals guarantees due
process through de novo review."
The Department's administrative tribunals formerly employed a
three-pronged test to determine whether a valuable mineral had been
discovered. The inquiry focused first on whether a vein or lode of
quartz or other rock had been found in place, whether the vein or
lode carried gold or some other mineral deposit, and finally if
[tihe two preceeding [sic] elements, when taken together, ....
warrant a prudent man in the expenditure of his time and money
in the effort to develop a valuable mine.... It is not enough that
the mineral values exposed might justify further prospecting or
exploration to determine whether actual mining operations would
be warranted.43
Contemporary tribunals have abandoned this test and almost
always interpret the various phrasings of mineral reservations in the
government's favor." Since Congress intended to fill the public
coffers with mineral lease revenues, courts have frequently held that
if the mineral is not necessary for successful surface development, it
was reserved. For example, in U.S. v. Union Oil Co. the Ninth Cir-
cuit analyzed the policies behind the SRHA and the Mineral Leasing
Act in finding that Congress had reserved geothermal resources to
the federal government.'5
Supp. 1361 (D. Ariz. 1976), affd sub nom. Thomas v. Andrus, 552 F.2d 871 (9th Cir.
1977) (surface owners had standing to bring private contest against the mineral claimants
before the Department of the Interior, and the Department had the authority to adjudicate
the contest under the SRHA).
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988).
Brock Livestock Co., Inc., 101 I.B.L.A. 91, 96-97 (1988).
42 Id.
3 Sedgwick v. Callahan, 9 I.B.L.A. 216, 224 (1973) (citations omitted).
44 Aulston, 915 F.2d at 589 n.6 (quoting 30 C.F.R. § 221.2(o) (1980)) (Following
language includes carbon dioxide: "Any fluid, either combustible or noncombustible,
which is produced in a natural state from the earth and which maintains a gaseous or
rarefied state at ordinary temperature and pressure conditions."); Union Oil, 549 F.2d at
1273 n.2 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 3814.2(a) (1976)) (Following language includes geother-
mal resources: "Excepting and reserving, however, to the United States all coal and other
minerals in the lands so entered and patented, together with the right to prospect for,
mine, and remove the same pursuant to the provisions and limitations of the Stock-Rais-
ing Homestead Act.").
' United States v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Geothermal resources contribute nothing to the capacity of the
surface estate to sustain livestock. They are depletable subsurface
reservoirs of energy, akin to deposits of coal and oil, which it was
the particular objective of the reservation clause to retain in public
ownership. The purposes of the Act will be served by including
geothermal resources in the statute's reservation of 'all the coal
and other minerals.' Since the words employed are broad enough
to encompass this result, the Act should be so interpreted.'
The Supreme Court's latest criterion for determining if a miner-
al estate has been reserved boils down to determining if the mineral
can be extracted profitably: if there is a profit to be had, it belongs
to the government.47 In fact, courts have read the word "miner-
al" 4 expansively to include gravel 9 and even carbon dioxide
gas. 0 While recent decisions appear to come out more or less uni-
formly in the government's favor, "the question of just what miner-
als are included in the reservation is still being litigated."'"
Finally, rather than pursuing an adversarial remedy, a surface
owner may seek the administrative equivalent of a declaratory judg-
ment that the federal government does not have a valid interest in a
given mineral. The Department of the Interior has authority to issue
a recordable "disclaimer of interest," which effectively conveys a
portion of the mineral estate to the surface owner.5 2
*1 Id., 549 F.2d at 1279. The court mentioned in a footnote that surface water
would be material to a livestock operation and so should be considered part of the sur-
face estate. id.
See, e.g., Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 55 (1983) ("What is
significant is that gravel can be taken from the soil and used for commercial purposes.")
The Court in Watt took judicial notice of the dubious fact that "[s]tock-raising and rais-
ing crops do not ordinarily involve the extraction of gravel from a gravel pit." Id at 56.
This conclusion stands in contrast to the Court's acknowledgment that surface owners
could exploit the mineral estate for domestic uses: homesteaders have "no right to obtain
coal [from the land], except for their own domestic use." Id. at 54.
' For an amusing collection of various and often conflicting constructions of the
word "mineral", see Harrison, supra note 13.
See Watt, 462 U.S. at 60.
' "Congress' employment of the word in a statute creating power to reserve natu-
ral resource rights indicates that 'gas' should be understood to mean a natural resource
in the legal and technical context of its commercial exploitation." Aulton, 915 F.2d at
589. Ultimately finding that Congress had been silent when it specified that gas was to
be reserved, the court deferred to the Interior department's interpretation as including all
gas, even gas, like carbon dioxide, which has no direct value as fuel. id.
" Harrison, supra note 13, at 143.
52 Aulston v. United States, 915 F.2d 584, 588 (10th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 500
U.S. 916 (1991) ("Mhe FLPMA authorizes the Interior Deparment to issue a sort of
quitclaim deed to clear title to real property in which the United States may have a
[VOL. I0:I
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B. The Bonding Process
Obtaining a mineral lease from the government does not auto-
matically permit the lessee to enter the surface land to begin mining.
The Stock-Raising Homestead Act requires that the mineral lessee
(1) obtain the surface owner's consent to enter; (2) reach a private
agreement with the surface owner as to how damage will be com-
pensated; or (3) post a bond against which the surface owner can
levy to recover damages.53
The bond's purpose is to "assure compensatory protection to
the surface owner."54 The scope of that protection is limited to spe-
cific statutory items, namely damage to crops or tangible improve-
ments to the land,55 and damage to the land's grazing value.'
Moreover, courts read the statutory items of damages narrowly. In
Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, the Supreme Court held that a
surface owner's prospects of compensation for damage to improve-
ments are severely limited.5" The Court read the damages recover-
able against a bond to exclude residential improvements:
[A]gricultural improvements are the kind intended. Certainly [the
language of the SRHA] is not intended to include improvements
placed on the land, after the mining operations are under way, for
purposes plainly incompatible with the right to proceed with those
operations until the oil and gas are exhausted."8
The surface owner's ability to recover against the bond is further
limited in that damage to the land itself is not covered.59
The foreseeable extent of recoverable damages is measured,
colorable but invalid interest.") (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1745 (1982) and 43 C.F.R. §§
1864.0-1 to .4 (1989)).
" Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 51 (1983).
54 Hayes, 122 I.B.L.A. 68, 71 (1992).
" 43 U.S.C. § 299(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
30 U.S.C. § 54 (1988).
Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488 (1928).
Id. at 505.
Hayes, 122 I.B.L.A. 68 (1992) (citations omitted).
To the extent that appellants contend that the amount of the bond should also reflect the
amount of money it will take to fully reclaim the land, they are in error. That is not
the purpose of the surface protection bond .... It is not intended to provide for recla-
mation of the land in the event that the mine operator fails to reclaim the land.
Id. at 75.
The Board of Land Appeals mentioned in a footnote, however, that state law
required a separate bond for costs of reclamation.
Id. at 72.
1994-951
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however, partly in terms of acres affected. In Brock Livestock Co.,
Inc.,' the Interior Board of Land Appeals held that the amount of
the bond depended "upon the [acreage of the] claims to be entered,
not upon the area of planned mining operations proposed6 by the
mineral applicant." 2 The bond accordingly must specify the areas
to be entered by a mineral claimant to permit the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) to determine possible covered damages and set
the amount of the bond.63
The BLM must estimate the extent of possible damages to
determine the amount of the bond." In addition to considering the
area that may be damaged, the BLM must consider the nature of the
mineral deposit and the most likely mining methods.' This analy-
sis results in an estimate of the number of acres in the area likely to
be affected by the lease. For grazing lands, the number of acres to
be affected is next multiplied by a number called the Animal Unit
Month (AUM).' The resulting number is multiplied by the value
of an AUM and the number of months in the lease.67 One calcula-
tion along these lines covered 110 acres for 20 years. The value of
the land for twenty years of grazing, thus calculated, was $1,870.'
Since each entity must assume liability under the bond, liability
is joint and several when more than one entity participates in the
mining operation. Consequently, allowing some members to avoid
bonding "could permit some members of a group of mining claim-
ants to avoid the effect of the bonding provision, and to perhaps
escape liability for conduct for which the individual may have been
responsible."
Confronted with an executed bond and a valid discovery, a
surface owner has little, if any, power to prevent the mineral lessee
from entering his land.' For example, in Reno Livestock Corp. v.
Brock Livestock Co., Inc., 101 InLBd. Land App. 91 (1988).
61 This language is a paraphrase of the 'logical mining area' test, disfavored in this
opinion, but employed as recently as January, 1992. See Hayes, 122 I.B.L.A. 68 (1992).
6 Brock Livestock, 101 I.B.L.A. at 98.
63 id.
" Hayes, 122 I.B.L.A. 68 (1992).
65 Id.
66 AUM is defined as the "amount of forage necessary for the sustenance of one
cow or its equivalent for a period of I month." 43 CFR 4100.0-5 (1992). Hayes, 122
I.B.L.A. 68 at n.5 (1992) (corresponding figure used for cropland.). The value of an
AUM is set by the BLM. 1d. at n.6.
67 Hayes, 122 1.B.L.A. 68 (1992).
" Id. at 75.
0 Brock Livestock, 101 I.B.L.A. at 97.
" See supra note 3. The Stock-Raising Homestead Act phrases the conditions
[VOL. 10:1
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Sun Oil Co.,7 the surface owner sought to enter a private agree-
ment with the mineral lessee for, among other things, initial damag-
es of $5,000 and annual damages of $1,000.72 The mineral lessee
asserted that it had posted a bond and nothing more was required."
The Wyoming Supreme Court agreed, and further found the surface
owner's appeal had so little merit that he had to pay attorney's
fees.7"
The bond at issue in the Reno Livestock Corp. case was not
posted with specific reference to the surface owner's estate.75 Rath-
er, the mineral lessee had posted a nationwide bond for the benefit
of the United States and "the owner of any of the land subject to the
coverage of this bond... ,76 Nationwide bonds had been approved
in Coquina Oil Corp." as an alternative to the site-specific bonds
discussed above. Such bonds, however, are limited to oil and gas
leases."8
The bonds previously discussed are prescribed by government
form; for example, the Hayes decision cites to bond form 3814-l.79
The form bond in the Hayes decision gives the surface owner the
right to demand compensation contemporaneously with damages he
suffers:
ITihe principal and surety are bound to provide "upon demand"
compensation for all damages which the surface owner shall "suf-
fer or sustain or a court of competent jurisdiction may determine
and fix in an action brought on th[e) bond... by reason of the
mining and removing by the principal(s) of the above-designated
mineral deposits from said described land." Therefore, demand
may be made immediately after damages are sustained. In the
event that the demand is not satisfied, the principal and surety are
considered to be "in default" and the surface owners may then
proceed on the bond.'
precedent to entry in the alternative: only one must be satisfied before the mineral lessee
has the right to enter.
7' Reno Livestock Corp. v. Sun Oil Co., 638 P.2d 147 (Wyo. 1981).
72 Id. at 149.
" Id. at 150.
I d. at 155.
" Id. at 150.
76 Id.
" Coquina Oil Corp., 41 I.B.L.A. 248 (1979).
7 Id. (citing 43 C.F.R. §§ 3104.3(b), 3814.1(d)). Further exploration of the many
and varied distinctions that arise between oil and gas development and all other types of
development of the subsurface estate is beyond the scope of this paper.
Hayes, 122 I.B.L.A. at 74 (1992).
' Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp. of Delaware, 100 P.2d 528 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994-951
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Since posting a sufficient bond eliminates any need for the
surface owner's acquiescence in mineral development, it is a power-
ful tool for mineral operators. Moreover, the mineral operators'
liability under the bond is limited to statutory damages. The enunci-
ated purpose of the bond, "assur[ing] compensatory protection to the
surface owner,"'" is strictly limited in amounts recoverable. The
single factor weighing in favor of the surface owner is the provision
for prompt recovery on the bond. The purpose of the bond, there-
fore, might be more accurately portrayed as lowering obstacles to
the development of the mineral estate by throwing a sop to the
surface owner.
C. Common Law Remedies
Common law remedies may not remain available to aggrieved
parties in severed estates. While the law of federally severed surface
and mineral estates does not exclusively preempt state law, 82 the
permissible operation of state law remains unclear.83 Tort remedies
available to a surface owner when the mineral lessee has not satis-
fied a condition precedent to entrys may not be available in other
situations. With tort remedies, the quantum of damages appears to
differ significantly from the federally prescribed amounts.
In Loomis & McGrew v. Richwell Resources, Ltd.,8' an unpub-
lished opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found mineral
operators liable for trespass on SRHA lands." The mineral opera-
tors' had posted a bond required under state law, but had "never
obtained the Bureau of Land Management's approval of its bond
prior to beginning work on its claim."' The Court held that the
1940)); Id., (citing 12 AM. JuR. Bonds § 34 (1964).
SI See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp., 100 P.2d 528 (Cal. C. App. 1940).
See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 693 P.2d 227
(Wyo. 1985).
"3 See generally Harrison, supra note 13 ("Jurisdictional disputes [between state and
federal regulation of mining activities] were inevitable, and have yet to be fully re-
solved.").
" See, e.g., Loomis & McGrew v. Richwell Resources, Ltd., No. 90-35903, 1991
WL 180075 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished opinion).
5 Id.
86 Id.
' While the decision is vague on this point, it appears that the mineral operators
actually owned the mineral estate. The Ninth Circuit found that the conditions to entry
of the SRHA applied nevertheless. Id.
n Id at 2.
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mineral operators had not perfected their right to enter the land. 9
The Ninth Circuit allowed the surface owner to recover $10,000 in
tort damages for the trespass, affirming the district court's use of the
reasonable rental value of the property in measuring the damages.'
The Court further held the various mineral operators jointly and
severally liable.9t The measure of damages in tort place the surface
owner in a considerably better position than if he had recovered
against the bond only.'
In Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp. the court found that allow-
ing the surface owner to pursue a tort action against the mineral
lessee for a continuing trespass did not conflict with federal law.93
In Bourdieu the mineral lessee operated an oil well on the surface
owner's land that, "from time to time caused various gulches and
ravines on the premises to be filled with oil and waste products
from the... wells." 4 The court found that the oil and waste prod-
ucts:
[WIould naturally be injurious to [the surface owner's] sheep
grazing land and, we think, [constitute] an additional injury not
contemplated nor permitted by any of the statutes involved in the
case,95 which statutes, as well as respondents' leases covering
[the surface owner's] land, gave respondent lessees only the right
to "occupy so much of the surface thereof as may be required for
all purposes reasonably incident to the mining and removal of
minerals therefrom.",
The court concluded the disposal of wastes and oil onto the
surface was "without right and is in the nature of the continuing
trespass giving rise to separate and successive causes of action for
the consequential damages as the same are, from time to time, sus-
tained."97 The holding in Bourdieu appears intrusive into the do-
main of federal regulation. The court accurately characterized the
" See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1502 (6th ed. 1990) (A trespass is "[alny unau-
thorized intrusion or invasion of private premises or land of another.").
' Loomis & McGrew v. Richwell Resources, Ltd., No. 90-35903, 1991 WL
180075 (9th Cir. 1991).
"' Id.
92 Contrast the $10,000.00 award in this case with the bond calculation supra text
accompanying note 68.
9' Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp. of Delaware, 100 P.2d 528 (Cal. CL App.
1940).
9' Id. at 534.
9 The Stock-Raising Homestead Act and the Agricultural Entry Act.
9' Bourdieu, 100 P.2d at 534.
97 Id.
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damages as beyond the contemplation of the applicable statutes.
Since the federal law did not contemplate the trespass in Bourdieu,
it follows that the court should not look to federal law for a remedy.
This holding does not conflict with the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Loomis & McGrew. The mineral lessee's right to enter the surface
depends upon federal law; if the right is not perfected, the mineral
lessee is a garden variety trespasser subject to liability under state
law.
Since the applicable state statute of limitations applies to tort
claims, a surface owner may spend all his time in court litigating his
state claims. If the surface owner fails to file his claims within the
limitations period, he will be left only with claims against the bond.
Because of the limited damages recoverable against the bond, it is
entirely possible that damages recoverable in a state-law action (as
beyond the contemplation of the federal statutes) cannot be recov-
ered against the bond, although no court has reached this conclu-
sion.
D. Contract Remedies
The Mineral Leasing Act provides that the surface owner and
the mineral lessee may reach a private agreement for compensation
of damages." While there appear to be no reported cases concern-
ing such an agreement, the proposition bears discussion." The
Bourdieu and Reno cases suggest a contract whereby the surface
owner would collect damages from the mineral lessee, allowing the
parties to craft their own remedies." ° A private contract modeled on
the royalty contracts which prevail under state law of severed estates
might be an effective vehicle for such an agreement.' Royalty
agreements generally give the surface owner a percentage of the
profit from the mineral development."° Although this arrangement
would be unsatisfactory insofar as the surface owner's compensation
would bear no relation to the damage suffered by his estate, a well-
" See the second option for occupation of surface by holder of mineral rights at
supra note 3.
" Indeed, the fact that my research uncovered no cases concerning private agree-
ments may be a testimonial to their effectiveness, for, if the agreements do exist, the
lack of reported litigation may be the result of effective lawyering.
"® See supra notes 6 and 17 and accompanying text.
101 See generally Ronald W. Polston, Surface Rights of Mineral Owners - What
Happens When Judges Make Law and Nobody Listens, 63 N.D.L. REV. 41 (1987).
102 Id.
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crafted agreement could subsume the claims provided by both state
and federal law, providing more complete compensation. To the
extent it provided an efficient device for recovery of damages in fair
amounts, such an agreement could significantly reduce the costs
associated with litigation for both parties."
E. Intervention by State or Local Government
The states and their subdivisions have sought to prevent miner-
al operations on certain lands through zoning or other regulation.
The supremacy clause,"° however, strictly limits the permissible
scope of local regulation of mineral activity and it forbids any out-
right prohibition."5
In Elliott v. Oregon International Mining Co., 6 officials in
Grant County, Oregon passed two ordinances prohibiting mining in
certain parts of the county." The plaintiffs owned an SRHA sur-
face estate on which defendant conducted a mining operation.0 8
The plaintiffs sued to enjoin the mining as violative of the ordinanc-
es. The Oregon Court of Appeals held the ordinances unconstitu-
tional, saying that because
Congress has specifically authorized mineral claimants to enter
lands patented under the Stock Raising Homestead Act for the
purpose of mining and removing valuable mineral deposits, Grant
County cannot prohibit that action by its ordinances. To hold
otherwise "... would place the public domain of the United
States completely at the mercy of state legislation."'"
103 While litigation costs might be reduced, the lawyer drafting such an agreement
should be aware that it has the potential to significantly increase federal taxation costs.
See generally Gilbertz v. United States, 808 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding, inter
alia, compensatory damages paid by mineral lessee to surface owner are considered
recovery of capital (basis) for tax purposes; payments received in advance (e.g. for re-
lease from liability for damages) are not compensatory and therefore cannot be treated as
recovery of capital; conveyance of an easement for the term of the lease is not a sale of
the easement, so proceeds from the sale cannot be treated as capital gains).
'04 U.S. CONST., Art. IV.
" See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 693
P.2d 227, 238 (Wyo. 1985) (citing Granite Rock Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 590
F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (local regulation that does not amount to a "local veto
power" is permissible)).
"' Elliott v. Oregon Int'l Mining Co., 654 P.2d 663 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
,o id. at 665.
108 Id.
"09 Id. at 668 (citing Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543, and Camfield v. United States, 167
U.S. 518, 526 (1897)).
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The holding in Elliott is consistent with other cases balancing
local regulatory power against the supremacy clause."' In other
contexts, most notably where states enact environmental regulations,
state laws have not been preempted by federal legislation."' In Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n,"2 for
instance, the Wyoming Supreme Court construed local environmen-
tal regulation of mining on federal lands. The court found "no intent
by Congress to exclude states from regulating mining activities on
federal land so as to safeguard environmental values.".. Such reg-
ulation is unlikely to survive where SRHA lands are concerned;
local government "cannot prohibit conduct which Congress has
specifically authorized. That is the meaning of the Supremacy
Clause."" 4
F. Acquisition of the Mineral Estate
An SRHA surface owner, committed to preventing mineral
activity on his land, may buy the mineral estate from the federal
government." 5 The surface owner must show either that there are
no known mineral values in the land or that surface development
would be a more beneficial use of the land than mineral develop-
ment. "6 Agricultural use of the surface cannot constitute a more
beneficial use of the land, however." 7
The surface owner's burden will generally involve both prongs,
because almost any land in the country has some mineral value
under the analysis approved by the Interior Board of Land Ap-
110 See, e.g., Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979) (lo-
cal zoning and use permit requirement struck down under the supremacy clause);
Brubaker v. Board of County Comm'rs, 652 P.2d 1050 (Colo. 1982) (potential conflict
with county's long-range plans is not sufficient basis for obstructing Congressional pur-
pose; local government cannot forbid action which Congress has expressly permitted).
.. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 693
P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1985) and cases digested therein.
112 Id.
' Id. at 238.
"4 Elliott, 654 P.2d at 668.
" Section 209(b) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1719(b) (1988).
i Id. See also 43 C.F.R. 2720.0-6.
"' See Klump, 123 I.B.L.A. 51 (1992) ("To allow a homesteader to acquire a
mineral interest under section 209 of FLPMA simply because it conflicts with grazing
would defeat the demonstrated congressional desire to allow multiple use of stock-raising
homestead lands.")
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peals. "8 The BLM will use a subjective process in making its fin-
dings; the BLM must only determine the land to be "prospectively
valuable for mineral occurrence."" 9 The surface owner thus will
make his case by showing more benefit from nonmineral develop-
ment of the land than mineral development.
In Wayne D. Klump, the surface owner wanted to build a resi-
dential area on his land; he estimated "an 85-90 [percent] chance
that homes and businesses will be built on this property," though
none had yet been erected." The Interior Department Board of
Land Appeals held:
no proof of imminent development has been submitted. Allega-
tion, hypothesis, or speculation that appropriate nonmineral devel-
opment might take place at some future time is not a sufficient
basis for conveyance.... Thus, it is insufficient to rely on a mere
possibility of qualifying nonmineral development.'
This holding creates an obvious and troubling paradox. In the
same opinion, the Board of Land Appeals noted that, if the surface
owner erected any non-agricultural improvements on the land, dam-
age to them caused by a mineral lessee would not be compensa-
ble. Only an owner comfortable with a great deal of risk would
develop the surface estate without first acquiring the mineral estate.
But a surface owner cannot acquire the mineral estate without first
developing the surface estate."
In Kinney-Coastal Oil v. Kieffer'24, the surface owner platted
a townsite over the mine area after mining operations had begun.
Once the plat was recorded, Kieffer "began actively to sell and
contract the lots as platted, and the purchasers began to erect build-
ings thereon for residential and business purposes."'" Each deed




Iz Id. (citation omitted). The Board explained:
Where nonmineral use of the surface estate is no longer restricted to graz-
ing, but entails (for example) development of lands for suburban housing,
the owner of the surface estate is vulnerable, as his right to collect damag-
es under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act . . . is limited to damages to
the value of the lands for grazing, which may be substantially less than its
value for the nonmineral development.
123 Id.
2.4 Kinney-Coastal Oil v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488 (1928).
3 Id. at 505-06.
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contained the mineral reservation to the United States."26 By the
time the mining operator sought relief in federal court, there were
80 or so buildings erected. 27 "(Tihe lots immediately surrounding
plaintiffs' well locations had been reserved, and would not be of-
fered for sale."'28 The district court awarded the mineral operator
an injunction."'
The U.S. Supreme Court held, in affirming the district court,
that the surface development was impermissible because it would
seriously interfere with mineral exploitation."'3 The Court awarded
damages to the surface owner, but limited the award to those
damages "which the plaintiffs' entry and operations under the lease
may have caused to the agricultural improvements or crops of the
owner of the surface estate.''3
In Kieffer, the surface owner did not attempt to acquire the
mineral estate outright, but the decision in Klump hints that such
action would not have altered the outcome. Perhaps a combination
of the persuasive factors present in the two cases-profitable surface
development and merely speculative potential for mineral
development-could convince a court that surface development is
more beneficial than mineral development.
Showing those two elements imposes a seemingly
insurmountable burden on the surface owner. This allocation of
burdens should be changed to allow the surface owner a bona fide
opportunity to show that surface development could be beneficial.
Placing the burden on the surface owner to show that his proposed
surface development would be beneficial seems logical enough,
since the surface owner should be well-positioned to argue for the
merit of his plan. But the BLM should carry the burden of showing
an imminent likelihood that the mineral estate will be developed.
Unless the burdens are changed, the mere subjective possibility that
the mineral estate will be developed at some future date will rebut
any suggestion the surface development might be more benefi-
cial. 32 This seems backward: a solid proposal for imminent and
valuable surface development should outweigh subjective specula-
tion as to some relatively invaluable development of the mineral
26 Kinney-Coastal Oil v. Kieffer, 1 F.2d 795 (D. Wyo. 1924).
'7 Id. at 796.
123 Id.
129 Id. at 798.
,,0 Kinney-Coastal, 277 U.S. at 506.
"' Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
.32 See supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text.
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estate that may occur some time in the future.
G. Alternative Statutory Remedies
Congress has developed an alternative to the bond/consent/
contract model previously discussed. The Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA)"' manifests what one
writer has described as an "absolute consent" model:'34
Congress granted an interest in federally reserved coal to some
private owners of overlaying land. The federal coal lessee may not
remove the coal by strip mining without the consent of the surface
owner.... Under thlis) law[], the owner of the surface estate is
not merely a servant of the coal estate, but becomes a joint ven-
turer with the coal estate owner. The absolute consent requirement
allows the surface owner to veto surface mining of coal or to
condition consent to mining on the mineral developer's agreement
to exorbitant demands. By contrast, surface owners cannot make
unreasonable demands of mineral owners under a regime allowing
only court-appraised damages for destruction of the surface es-
tate.1
35
The absolute consent model differs from the SRHA's mecha-
nisms, that give the surface owners compensation for the loss of
enumerated items. Although strip mining is entirely different from
conventional mineral extraction, the comparison is helpful, since it
illustrates the different positions of surface owners under SRHA and
SMCRA.
The property rights of the surface owner under SRHA can
essentially be defined by reference to the items for which the sur-
face owner can be compensated. Beyond those items and the right
to convey the property, the surface owner has few rights. Certainly
he has no absolute right to quiet enjoyment, nor the absolute right to
exclude others from entry onto his land. The surface owner under
SMCRA, on the other hand, has the power to assert these rights, at
least until the would-be mineral operator sweetens the pot enough
that saying no would be irrational.
Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture'36 reflects another part of the fragmented and
.3 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988). SMCRA concerns strip-mining, a subject not
treated in this article.
34 Mansfield, supra note 12.
135 id.
" Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Agric., 817 F.2d
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schizophrenic scheme of federal natural resources regulation. In
Park County, the mineral lessee's permission to drill on federal
lands - lands not in any restricted-use category - was conditioned
on compliance with a variety of safeguards, including:
requirfing] the lessee to take all reasonable steps to prevent
unnecessary soil erosion or timber damage, unnecessary air and
water pollution, and unnecessary damage of surface
improvements, fossils or artifacts and to restore the land surface to
its former condition after use... terminated.... [And further
requiring thatj prior to undertaking any ground disturbance
activities, the lands had to be surveyed for any endangered or
threatened plant or animal species, and a report thereon filed,
possibly resulting in use restrictions or even complete use
prohibition. Finally, the lease restricted use of certain areas during
specified time periods of the year for the protection of big game
habitat, as well as for the preservation of the land's recreational
use.
137
These stringent requirements have not been applied to a
mineral lessee's operations when the land belonged to an individual,
rather than the federal government. The Park County case probably
does not reveal any conscious policy decision that the rights of trees
weigh more heavily than property rights. Nevertheless, the contrast
provides a valuable illustration of the diminished status of surface
owners in federal severed estates.
CONCLUSION
Harrison points out that the conflicts between surface owners
and mineral lessees are intractable under federal law: "No coherent
policy resolves these conflicts in any predictable way, and statutory
and common law resolutions are developed mainly at the state lev-
el."'38
One alternative to accommodating the competing interests of
surface owners and mineral lessees under the SRHA and the Agri-
cultural Entry Act would be to adopt the absolute consent model
employed under the SMCRA. Another alternative is federal preemp-
tion of the common law remedies discussed above. The desirability
of uniformity appears evident, especially in situations like those
609 (10th Cir. 1987).
' Id. at 613 (citations omitted).
'3' Harrison, supra note 13.
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previously discussed where the competing rights originate in federal
law. Differing results from state to state have little justification
where the states have little or no interest in the policies behind the
litigation. The need for uniformity may be better addressed through
a system of regulation grounded in the kinds of policies that strike a
balance between the rights of people occupying land and the ex-
ploitable resources on and under the land.

